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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. ...X.X...5.138

Date Rec'd SA ...FEB 5 1945

(XY 4937)

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	Fwd'd.		
1. I-A		3/8	3/9	RC	
2. Plummer		3/10		RC	priming 1 & del same as XX 4937 previously coded
3. I-1		3/12		RC	and Det (p. 10) -
4. Dugger		1945		M.D./H.M.	
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8.		DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 25X2 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2001 2008			
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INTELLIGENCE	48
JAN 29 1951	
INTEGRATION DIVISION	
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Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.
 Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
 For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

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XK-5/38

ROUGH 185

1 February 1945

TO: SAINT, Washington
FROM: SAINT, London (German Section) 33-055
SUBJECT: *Anno Nebel, Ludwig*
OSTRICH and the SD

1. Attached hereto is a copy of a report which we think will be of interest to you.

Distribution:

SAINT, Washington 1
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(X)

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OSTRICH AND THE S.D.

OSTRICH, in an interview on 4.1.45, gave the following miscellaneous information about the Sicherheitsdienst; he was not systematically questioned on any of these points.

1. The Offices of AMT VI. The main offices of AMT VI in May 1944 were still in 11 Berkaerstrasse, in spite of the bombing of the Berkaerstrasse. VI F was still in the Delbruckstrasse, and the special false passport section under STUBAF KRUGER in the Baymeistrasse. But SCHELLENBERG himself had an office at Zossen with the O.K.W.
2. Sabotage training schools. When the sabotage training schools had been evacuated from The Hague and Heinrichsburg, AMT VI 3 set up a school or schools in the Steyermark; OSTRICH was told this by an officer of VI 3.
3. Relations between VI 3 and VI F. OSTRICH repeated that VI 3 came into existence at the time of the rescue of Mussolini; before this VI F under Stubaf. DOEBNER had planned a few operations, but there was no special operation section of AMT VI. Since January VI F under Stubaf. LASSIG had become merely a supply and equipment section and had no part in policy or the planning of operations; Stubaf. LASSIG is only an inflated quartermaster. VI F seconded specialists such as FAULHABER and ANTERBER to VI 3 for training purposes, but OSTRICH was certain that the schools were under SKORZENY's orders.
4. The headquarters of VI 3 were (in May 1944) at Schloss FRIEDENTHAL, though there was also an office in the Berkaerstrasse. Both in the Berkaerstrasse and at FRIEDENTHAL living was austere. The general belief that S.D. officers in Germany have a good time is quite untrue. At FRIEDENTHAL everyone lived on the rations of the ordinary soldier and respected military discipline. There was great jealousy of those who lived well abroad.
5. KNOCHEN. There was general resentment of KNOCHEN's appointment as BDC in France because he was comparatively young. His career was founded on his part in the Venlo incident. When he returned from France he was dismissed from the SIPO and degraded, and is now in the Waffen S.S. (?).
6. Undertakings. OSTRICH had heard from BESEKOV of operation HENRIETTE in Belgium. He had the impression that it was not as large and ambitious as JEANNE. He had also been told by BESEKOV of an undertaking THEODOR in the Balkans, probably in Yugoslavia, but he did not know where this operation had been planned and executed (if it was executed); he believes that it may have been connected with a joint undertaking of the S.D. and Waffen S.S. which was intended to capture Marshal TITO with his headquarters. He is confident that there were no successful VI 3 operations between the Mussolini episode (September 1943) and October 1944.
7. Personalities. OSTRICH has a generally low opinion of the abilities of the officers of AMT VI and VI 3. There are some good soldiers among them, but very few intelligence officers. There are a few exceptions; RADL, SKORZENY's adjutant, and a Viennese, is educated and intelligent. STUBAF himself is a typical Waffen S.S. man, an efficient soldier but in no sense an intelligence

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officer. The only intelligent man at FRIEDENTHAL other than RADL is von VOELKERSAM, formerly of the BRANDENBURG Regiment. Von VOELKERSAM comes from an old Baltic German family, and has a specialised knowledge of the Eastern Front; he is not concerned with the West. BESEKOW, responsible for VI S operations in every part of Europe, is active but ignorant; he knows no French, and will remain dependent on OSTRICH for guidance about France; Charlie HAGEDORN, he asserts, is equally ignorant and dependent. DOERING is a pompous official; only NEISSER either had or could have any useful independent contacts with the French. He has some respect for Staf. STEINLE and Ostuf. BERNHARD, who direct AMT VI espionage in the West. But he does not believe that there are any S.D. officers who do or can understand and so exploit efficiently the various French fascist organisations at their disposal.

Some allowance must be made for OSTRICH's optimism.

He stated that the JEANNE organisation was controlled by Referat VI S 4.

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